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 INTRODUCTION TO  THE 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
PHILOSOPHY OF SKILL AND 
EXPERTISE 
 Ellen Fridland and Carlotta Pavese 1 
 The diverse and breathtaking intelligence of the human animal is often embodied in skills. 
People, throughout their lifetimes, acquire and refi ne a vast number of skills. And there seems 
to be no upper limit to the creativity and beauty expressed by them. Think, for instance, of 
Olympic gymnastics:  the amount of strength, fl exibility, and control required to perform 
even a simple beam routine amazes, startles, and delights. In addition to the sheer beauty of 
skill, performances at the pinnacle of expertise often display a kind of brilliance or genius. We 
observe an intelligence that saturates the body. The unity of physicality and intellect, mind and 
body, meshed and melded. 
 Apart from sports, people develop a host of other skills, including musical and artistic skills, 
linguistic and social skills, scientifi c and medical skills, military and political skills, engineering 
skills, computer skills, business skills, etc. What’s more, skill acquisition and refi nement occur 
throughout the human lifespan. Children work on skills from infancy and throughout develop-
ment and adults will often continue to refi ne skills through old age. The variety, ubiquity, and 
centrality of skills in the lives of humans is quite simply remarkable. 
 Although notions of skill and expertise have always fi gured prominently in a variety 
of philosophical discussions, the last couple of decades have seen an explosion of direct 
interest in skill and practical expertise. Crucially, debates about know- how and virtue epis-
temology have fueled interest in the notion of skill and practical knowledge in areas such 
as epistemology, ethics, and action theory. Also, philosophers of cognitive science, as well as 
neuroscientists and psychologists, have become increasingly interested in issues concerning 
the nature of embodied expertise, motor skill, motor representation, and bodily control. As a 
result, across a variety of subfi elds from ancient and eastern philosophy, philosophy of mind, 
cognitive science, philosophy of perception, epistemology, action theory, ethics, political and 
social philosophy, and aesthetics, the debate concerning skill and practical intelligence is 
growing and thriving. 
 It is the aim of this Handbook to collect and systematize the most relevant positions in these 
burgeoning areas of philosophy and cognitive science. Contained within are 39 chapters written 
by leaders in their fi elds, addressing the role of skill in the history of philosophy both East 
and West, epistemology, political philosophy, ethics, and various areas of the cognitive sciences, 
01_9781138744776pre-c06_pi-99.indd   1 08-Jun-20   11:30:18 PM
2Ellen Fridland and Carlotta Pavese
2
including perception, imagination, emotion, motor control, language, and social cognition. The 
chapters off er both accessible overviews of the most relevant, current debates in their respective 
areas and, in many cases, also develop novel, substantive positions. 
 It should be noted that questions of skill and expertise are important not only for our 
particular, theoretical understanding of these specifi c notions but, more broadly, for our 
understanding of intelligence, cognition, and practical knowledge, full stop. That is, in thinking 
seriously about skill and expertise, we develop a fuller, richer picture of the nature of human 
cognition: moral, social, political, and embodied. This understanding, rooted in both theoret-
ical and empirical views, provides us with the opportunity to properly and substantively con-
ceptualize the nature of practical intelligence. This, in turn, allows and sometimes forces us to 
reformulate our current understanding of more familiar notions, such as knowledge, action, 
intention, virtue, perception, imagination, emotion, and even mental representation and intelli-
gence. In all, then, questions concerning skill are signifi cant in and of themselves, but also highly 
relevant for our overall understanding of the human mind. 
 Below, we introduce and contextualize the parts and chapters covered by this Handbook. 
 I.1  Skill in the history of philosophy (East & West) 
 I.1.1  Skill in the history of Eastern philosophy 
 Skill and expertise have played a prominent role in several traditions of Eastern thought, espe-
cially as those notions are connected to living the good, virtuous, or ethical life. For instance, 
skillful means or  upaya in Indian Buddhism, examples of expert swimmers or butchers in 
Daoism, and karate and calligraphy in the Chan/ Zen tradition are all taken either directly 
or indirectly to concern the cultivation of appropriate awareness, attention, and perception, 
which is thought essential for living the good life. Across traditions, spontaneity, naturalness, 
eff ortlessness, and absorption are central to the notion of skill, though exactly how these 
features ought to be understood is still a matter of some debate. The authors who have written 
about skill in the history of Eastern philosophy in this Handbook have provided us both with 
badly needed context and accessible but substantive overviews of the particular ways in which 
skill is relevant to various discussions in Indian, Chinese, and Japanese philosophy. Moreover, 
each chapter off ers its own way of making sense of the balance and/ or tension between spon-
taneity and wisdom. 
 In their chapter, “Skill and Virtuosity in Buddhist and Daoist Philosophy,” Jay L. Garfi eld 
and Graham Priest examine the various roles that skill plays in the Indian school of Mahayana 
Buddhism, in Daoism, and in Chan/ Zen thought. In Indian Buddhism, the notion of  upaya or 
skillful means is important for understanding not only skilled pedagogy, that is, teaching in a way 
that is appropriate to the understanding of the student, but also for grasping fundamental truths 
concerning the nonduality of practice and awakened consciousness. In this way, the ultimate 
state of personal wisdom is a state of skillful engagement with the world. This skillful engage-
ment is necessarily a moral engagement, though it is not simply the possession of virtue but, 
rather, the embodied moral skill of the virtuoso— eff ortless, natural, spontaneous, and responsive 
to context. 
 In Daoism as well as in Chan/ Zen Buddhism, the emphasis on skill is also connected, fun-
damentally, to concerns about living a good and ethical life. The characteristics of spontaneous, 
natural, absorbed, attentive, engaged, and mindful action that are found in skill are exactly those 
features that are required for living in an ethical and natural way. Garfi eld and Priest go on to 
present a substantive proposal for how to understand the spontaneity of skill— they claim that 
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acting without refl ective thinking does not imply that skilled action is thoughtless. Moreover, 
the skilled person knows both when and how to deliberate. Thus, thought and skill are not 
necessarily at odds, though skill is necessarily immediate and spontaneous. In fact, they claim 
that in eastern traditions, “practical knowledge embodied in skill is our principal cognitive 
achievement.” 
 Further examining the role of skill in Daoism but also in other schools within the Chinese 
tradition, Hagop Sarkissian provides an overview of skill and expertise in Chinese philosophy 
from the 6th– 3rd centuries BCE. His chapter, “Skill and Expertise in Three Schools of Classical 
Chinese Thought,” focuses on two prominent types of expertise that are often encountered in 
ancient Chinese thought: The fi rst is expertise at a particular craft, occupation, or  dao , as is most 
famously presented in the Daoist anthology  Zhuangzi . The second is ethical expertise in the 
Ruist (Confucian) and Mohist schools. 
 Sarkissian provides several accessible examples of skilled agents as they are described in key 
Chinese texts. This gives the nonspecialist reader an opportunity to grasp the range of cases 
where an appeal to the spontaneity, absorption, and eff ortlessness of skill becomes relevant to 
understanding the truly good and ethical life. Interestingly, Sarkissian also connects the intui-
tiveness and spontaneity of skilled action to Antonio Damasio’s ( 1999 ) somatic marker hypoth-
esis, off ering a way for us to understand how decision- making can become fi ne- tuned through 
practice and arise immediately with the appropriate emotional valence. 
 Next, Matthew MacKenzie’s chapter, “Volition, Action, and Skill in Indian Buddhist 
Philosophy,” examines the specifi c tensions in Buddhist philosophy between acting skillfully, 
with intention, volition, causal effi  cacy, and the production of karma and also without a self 
( anatman ). In the course of defl ating this tension, MacKenzie provides a primer in Buddhist 
psychology, ethics, and soteriology. First, MacKenzie argues that intentional action is central 
to the Buddhist conception of the human condition and the attendant prescriptions for how 
to liberate oneself from those conditions. However, the doctrine of no- self, which reduces 
the self to a collection of physical and psychological events is also incompatible with a full- 
blooded notion of agent- causation. In this way, the Buddhist is both robustly committed to 
intentional and skillful actions while also holding that the only causes of action are a complex 
of psycho- physical events (i.e., not a self). As such, agents should not be identifi ed with selves 
but, rather, with the complex psycho- physical system in which phenomena arise and lead to 
other phenomena. 
 MacKenzie goes on to explain that this complex system or continuum of psycho- physical 
events (the practical agent) is required to develop both wisdom and skillful means ( upaya ) in 
order to produce liberated action . However, there is a further paradox in that such action, in 
its maximal skillfulness, should be without intention, volition, and eff ort. Rather, such action is 
spontaneous, wise, compassionate but without even the practical illusion of a self. MacKenzie 
ends by providing two ways of understanding the transition from unawakened to awakened 
agency: one constructivist, which he connects to Hubert Dreyfus’ conception of expertise and 
the other innateist. 
 I.1.2  Skill in history of Western philosophy 
 The topic of skill and expertise ( techn ē ) in Plato and Aristotle has received attention both in 
relation to the notion of virtue and in the interpretation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of 
knowledge. Although both Plato and Aristotle took  techn ē to be a kind of knowledge, there 
is signifi cant controversy about their conceptions regarding the nature of this kind of know-
ledge and its relation to experience ( empeiria ) on one hand, and scientifi c knowledge ( epist ē m ē ) 
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on the other (Johansen  2017 ; Lorenz and Morison  2019 ; Coope  forthcoming ). The work of 
Julias Annas ( 1995 ,  2001 ,  2011 ) has renewed interest on the relation between skill and virtue 
(or  phron ē sis ) in the  Nicomachean Ethics and also to Aristotle’s action theory. Two chapters in 
our Handbook discuss Plato and Aristotle’s views precisely on the relation between  techn ē and 
 phron ē sis . 
 In “ Techn ē in the Platonic Dialogues,” Tom Angier introduces us to the complexities of 
Plato’s views on  techn ē . Angier argues that Plato’s conception of skill and expertise goes against 
modern expectations in at least two ways. First, the Greek concept of  techn ē has a wider exten-
sion than the English “skill” or “expertise.” In the dialogues, Socrates uses it not only to refer 
to crafts that yield a physical product but it is also used for activities whose outcome is either 
internal to the activity such as lyre- playing, or even purely theoretical, such as mathematics. 
The second respect under which Plato’s conception of skill goes against modern expectations, 
according to Angier, is that while ethics and skill or expertise are not always conjoined in 
modern philosophy, Plato’s interest in  techn ē is primarily  ethical. In a striking analogy with what 
we have seen above as a unifying theme in the Buddhist, Daoist, Chan/ Zen, Ruist, and Mohist 
traditions, a central question throughout the Platonic corpus is: can virtue be construed as a 
kind of skill or expertise? 
 Angier makes a systematic case that Plato saw in  techn ē a model of precision that approximates 
a science ( epist ē m ē ). As Angier points out, there are several benefi ts of thinking of virtue in this 
fashion. First, a science of virtue would  professionalize the ethical life and so secure it fi rmer 
grounds. To be  technikos is contrasted with having a mere  empeiria or “knack” and so if virtue 
were a matter of having a  techn ē , it would be taken out of the hands of those with a mere knack 
(or  empeiros ). For Plato, like later for Aristotle,  techn ē involves a  logos , or a rational account of one’s 
expertise. Possessing a rational grasp of what one is doing would be highly benefi cial to the 
virtuous person, for it would give them mastery and control of their practice. Moreover,  techn ē 
embodies knowledge and, because of this, it is transmissible through teaching. Angier points 
out that for Plato the transmissibility of  techn ē , primarily illustrated by theoretical  technai such as 
mathematics, is the paradigm source and locus of  agreement . The upshot is, perhaps surprisingly, 
both political and social: if virtue were subject to the rigors of a  techn ē , we would be spared 
much social disagreement and confl ict. 
 In Chapter 5, “ Technê in Aristotle’s Taxonomy of Knowledge,” Thomas Johansen moves from 
Plato to Aristotle and highlights the diff erences in their conceptions of the relation between 
 techn ē and  phron ē sis . The chapter starts by revisiting Aristotle’s notion that rational capacities are 
to do with truths and are accompanied by a true account ( logos ). Among rational capacities, 
Aristotle distinguished between  theoretical knowledge ,  productive knowledge , and  practical knowledge . 
While theoretical knowledge is concerned with necessary and eternal truths, productive and 
practical knowledge are concerned with contingent truths that can be under our infl uence 
and  that can be changed. So while theoretical knowledge is a  demonstrative state of reason 
concerned with eternal truths accompanied by a true account, and practical knowledge is a 
 practical state of reason accompanied by a true account, productive knowledge is a  productive state 
of reason accompanied by a true account. 
 So, while for Aristotle both  techn ē and  phron ē sis are rational capacities involving an account, 
 techn ē involves a distinctive sort of intelligence.  Techn ē and  phron ē sis diff er in at least two respects. 
While  phron ē sis is of an end without qualifi cation ( telos haplôs ),  techn ē is of “an end in rela-
tion to something and of something” ( telos pros ti and tinos ); second,  techn ē is of production 
and  phron ē sis is of action. Johansen guides us through several possible interpretations of these 
putative diff erences between  techn ē and  phron ē sis and highlights several diffi  culties. As Johansen 
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points out, the crucial point of contention of Aristotle’s response to Plato might also have been 
the most philosophically problematic for Aristotle. 
 Despite Aristotle’s attack, the Platonic idea that virtue can be conceived of as a certain sort 
of skill reemerges in modern thought in an exchange deftly reconstructed by Melissa Meritt in 
“Mendelssohn and Kant on Virtue as a Skill.” As Meritt teaches us, Moses Mendelssohn played 
a pivotal role in rehabilitating the “skill model” of virtue for the German rationalist tradition. 
According to Mendelssohn, the execution of skill characteristically displays a certain automa-
tism and unrefl ectiveness. Mendelssohn took this feature of skill, together with the skill model 
of virtue, to provide the resources for overcoming an objection against agent- based ethics, 
namely, that a virtuous person would seem to act for the sake of realizing his own perfection 
in everything that he does, thereby taking a morally inappropriate interest in his own character. 
By contrast, Kant rejects the automatism featured in Mendelssohn’s account, on grounds that 
it would make virtue mindless and unrefl ective. As Merritt points out, that does not mean that 
Kant was thereby led to reject the skill model of virtue. Rather, Kant argued that refl ection is 
central to the manifestation of certain kinds of skills too and, because of that, he was able to 
cling to a version of the  virtue as skill model. 
 The  next chapter of this historical section moves to the contemporary philosophy of skill. 
In “Gilbert Ryle on Skill as Knowledge- how,” Michael Kremer deepens our understanding 
of Ryle’s theory of skill. For Ryle, skill is a form of knowledge, or knowledge- how, that is 
constitutively acquired through practical and experimental learning and that depends on a 
critical capacity for self- regulation and continued improvement. Kremer makes the case that, 
while Ryle’s notion of knowledge- how is sharply distinguished from knowledge- that, for him, 
knowledge- how is also substantively related to knowledge- that. Kremer reconstructs two of 
the classic Rylean arguments against the intellectualist legend— the regress argument and the 
argument from learning and gradability— and puts Ryle in a dialogue with recent debates 
concerning intellectualism and anti- intellectualism about know- how. Kremer argues that Ryle 
considered the intellectual and perceptual skills needed to produce knowledge- that to be kinds 
of know- how and that those intellectual skills, on his account, were the barriers to the regress 
which he thought affl  icted intellectualism. Although knowledge- that depends on skills, Ryle 
also thought that skilled behavior depends in some ways on knowledge- that, especially since 
critical refl ection on one’s successes and failures requires an awareness of what one is doing and 
what its results are. Kremer’s discussion of Ryle’s conception of skill ends by looking at some 
of Ryle’s less well- known writings (e.g., Ryle  1967 ,  1970 ,  1972 ) in order to reconstruct how 
Ryle’s refl ection on philosophical skill relates to his experience as a teacher and to his theoret-
ical approach to the teaching of philosophy. 
 In the next chapter, Will Small discusses “Anscombe on Action and Practical Knowledge.” 
While for Ryle know- how is a  standing general knowledge that is put into practice on diff erent 
occasions of action, Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge is that of a distinctive kind of 
agential knowledge that an agent has of her particular intentional actions while she performs 
them. Anscombe held that if someone is X- ing  intentionally , she knows without observation 
not only that she is X- ing; she knows without observation  why she is X- ing. Small explains 
that Anscombe arrives at this well- known “non- observational claim” through a negative speci-
fi cation of the “rough outline” of the “area of intentional actions.” For Anscombe, the class of 
things that can be known without observation is a very heterogeneous class; hence, to know that 
intentional actions fall in that class is not to know much at all about what it is to be an inten-
tional action, for it is not to know anything about  why intentional actions fall in that class. The 
remainder of  Intention (Anscombe 1957) develops a positive account of intentional action and 
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agential knowledge. On this account, agential knowledge is knowledge “in intention”— hence 
not just knowledge of intention but knowledge in intention  of what is going to happen. This 
knowledge is practical not just because its object is practical. It is practical in  form , for it relates 
to its object in a diff erent way from that in which theoretical knowledge relates to its— in the 
case of practical knowledge, the knowledge itself is the  cause of what it understands. In this 
sense, agential knowledge is non- observational  because it is practical: what is going on is a case 
of intentional action, there to be observed, only because it is already known agentially. 
 Does agential knowledge, as Anscombe understands it, depend on skill/ know- how? Small 
provides evidence that, for Anscombe, one can intentionally do  A only provided that one knows 
how to  A , otherwise it would surely be some accident if her activity culminated in her having 
successfully done  A. So Anscombe did endorse an entailment— that from intentionally  A to 
knowing how to  A— that is widely endorsed in the current debate on knowing- how by both 
intellectualists and anti- intellectualists (Ryle  1949 ; Stanley and Williamson  2001 ; Setiya 2012; 
Pavese  2018 ). According to Small, however, Anscombe’s conception of know- how, though fully 
compatible with certain versions of intellectualism, fi ts most naturally with a “bifurcationist” 
conception of know- how, according to which there is propositional know- how but also non- 
propositional “basic know- how.” 
 While Anscombe insists that exercises of know- how are intentional, this is denied by Dreyfus 
( 2001 ); and while Anscombe argued that an agent exercising know- how knows that she is 
doing what she is doing and why, Dreyfus ( 2007 ) explicitly rejected this model of intentional 
action. These and other complexities of Dreyfus’ view on agency are discussed by Kristina 
Gehrman and John Schwenkler in their chapter, “Hubert Dreyfus on Practical and Embodied 
Intelligence.” Gehrman and Schwenkler locate Dreyfus’ account of “skilled coping” as part of 
a bigger picture that aimed to demonstrate the primacy of practical intelligence over all other 
forms of intelligence. It is in response to a standard picture of intentional action defended 
by his U.C. Berkeley colleague John Searle that Dreyfus came to elaborate his alternative to 
what he considered a standard and prevailing Platonic picture of human beings as essentially 
rational, individual agents. Like many contemporary action theories, Searle thought that an 
action is intentional only if the agent is in a mental state that represents the goal of her action; 
he also thought that this mental state is the cause of the bodily movement whereby the agent 
acts as she intends to and, in acting intentionally, an agent enjoys an  experience that represents 
her action as the cause of her bodily movement. Dreyfus attacked all of these claims, arguing 
that they are not supported by the phenomenology of purposive activity. If we returned to 
the phenomenon with open minds, Dreyfus thought that what we would fi nd would be that 
human beings can relate to the world in an organized purposive manner without their actions 
being accompanied by a representational state representing the goal of the action. Paradigmatic 
examples of these representation- less and yet purposive activities were, for Dreyfus, skillful 
activities like playing tennis or habitual activity like rolling over in bed or making gestures 
while speaking. In this sort of skillful coping, Dreyfus thought we fi nd humans fundamen-
tally embedded, absorbed, and embodied. Gehrman and Schwenkler document how these 
commitments to a non- mentalistic form of intentionality are present throughout Dreyfus’ 
philosophical writings, from his critique of Artifi cial Intelligence research in the 1970s and 
1980s to his rejection of John McDowell’s conceptualism in his 2005 APA Presidential Address. 
Because Dreyfus was, in the end, most interested in presenting an  at least equally plausible 
phenomenological account of skillful coping that could represent a viable alternative to the 
standard Platonic picture, Gehrman and Schwenkler guide us through Dreyfus’ radical pro-
posal for a contentless and non- mentalistic form of intentionality and practical intelligence, 
through to its deepest motivations. 
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 I.2  Skill in epistemology 
 Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. Scientists cannot collect new knowledge without 
developing their skills for devising experiments. And skilled artists, scientists, and mathematicians 
must know a lot about their area of expertise in order to perform skillfully and to routinely 
manifest that knowledge through their skillful performances. 
 Despite this obvious interrelationship, knowledge and skill have received diff erent treatment 
in analytic epistemology. Although philosophers in this tradition have long been in the business 
of understanding and defi ning knowledge, the topic of skill has been marginalized. It is only 
quite recently that skills have made a powerful entrance in two epistemological debates:  the 
debate on virtue epistemology and the debate on the nature of know- how. Part II encompasses 
four diff erent chapters that take positions on these two central epistemological debates. 
 According to virtue epistemology, skill and know- how come before knowledge:  know-
ledge is to be understood as a kind of skillful performance (Zagzebski  1996 ; Sosa  2007 ,  2015 ; 
Pritchard  2012 ; Turri  2018 ). This approach to epistemology is represented by two chapters of 
this handbook. In “Knowledge, Skill, and Virtue Epistemology,” Duncan Pritchard provides an 
overview of diff erent ways of understanding the virtue epistemological thesis that knowledge is 
to be conceived of in terms of the relationship between cognitive success and cognitive agency. 
Virtue epistemology is motivated by one key platitude: the  ability intuition — according to which 
guesswork, for example, cannot amount to knowledge, for in it the subject displays no cognitive 
agency. According to  robust virtue epistemology , there is nothing more to knowledge than virtu-
ously formed true belief. Robust virtue epistemology is motivated by the idea that knowledge 
is a distinctive kind of cognitive achievement. Although theoretically attractive, Pritchard points 
out that it faces several objections, in that it cannot always account for another prominent 
intuition, the  anti- luck intuition  – the intuition that lucky belief cannot amount to knowledge. 
In this chapter, Pritchard argues that a form of modest virtue epistemology— anti- luck virtue 
epistemology— that combines the ability intuition with the anti- luck intuition, fares better. On 
these sorts of virtue epistemologies, knowledge is to be understood as  safe ( non- lucky )  cognitive 
success which is attributable to one’s manifestation of the relevant cognitive skills. According to 
Pritchard, anti- luck virtue epistemology thus has the resources to account for how knowledge 
demands both the avoidance of high levels of epistemic luck (and thus epistemic risk) and the 
manifestation of signifi cant levels of relevant cognitive skill. 
 The  second chapter on virtue epistemology is “Skill and Knowledge” by Ernest Sosa and 
Laura Frances Callahan. Following Sosa’s ( 2007 , 2015)  prominent work in virtue epistem-
ology, Sosa and Callahan take knowledge to be a form of action, which one might attempt 
and fail. Attempts can be either accurate, as when the aim of the attempt is attained, adroit, as 
when the attempt manifests a competence, or apt, where accuracy of the attempt manifests the 
competence. A competence is defi ned as a  disposition to succeed and is understood as having a 
tripartite structure, for whether one is competent to perform on a certain occasion depends 
not only on one’s pertinent skills (Skill) but also on the shape one is in (Shape) and on the 
favorability of one’s relevant situation (Situation). Here, the authors present a detailed, and in 
some respects novel, robust virtue epistemological account. On this view, skills are  not the same 
as competences. While competences have a triple structure, only the innermost competence 
counts as a skill: for one might have a skill without being in good shape or while being in a bad 
situation. Because of this, Sosa and Callahan observe that only full competence, rather than mere 
skill, is the most important kind of power for epistemology, for the highest epistemic success 
(knowledge) manifests full competence: one knows if and only if one has a  true belief in virtue 
of one’s having exercised skill in an appropriate shape and situation. This account diff ers from 
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Pritchard’s anti- luck virtue epistemology where both a virtue condition and an anti- luck con-
dition play a role in defi ning knowledge. It also diff ers from modal virtue epistemologies (e.g., 
Beddor and Pavese  2018 ) that understand skillfulness in modal terms as counterfactual success. 
In fact, on Sosa and Callahan’s proposal, the modal profi le of a performance is irrelevant to its 
counting as apt. 
 A novel aspect of the virtue epistemological account defended by Sosa and Callahan in 
this chapter is that they appeal to knowledge in an understanding of justifi cation: epistemic 
performances that manifest skill without aptness are  mere justifi ed beliefs, which fall short of 
knowledge. The resulting virtue epistemology gives knowledge a central explanatory role to 
play vis- à- vis other concepts central to epistemology, such as that of justifi cation. In this sense, 
Sosa and Callahan’s counts as a “knowledge- friendly” virtue epistemology. 
 In addition to their role in virtue epistemology, skills and know- how have been central to 
epistemological discussions concerning the nature of know- how and skill. As we have seen, 
Ryle ( 1949 ) defended a form of anti- intellectualism about skill: skill is a kind of know- how 
and know- how is irreducible to propositional knowledge. Despite Ryle’s attack on the intel-
lectualist legend, the last twenty years have seen a resurgence of intellectualism (Stanley and 
Williamson  2001 ; Stanley  2011a ; Pavese  2013 ), in a variety of forms. Stanley and Williamson 
( 2001 ) responded to Ryle by arguing that know- how and skill come apart and that knowledge- 
how consists in a distinctive kind of propositional knowledge about how to perform actions — 
a state of knowing an answer to the question how one could perform the action under a 
distinctively  practical mode of presentation . Moreover, they argued that one of Ryle’s main motiv-
ations — he regress argument— fails. 
 This form of intellectualism was primarily motivated by linguistic considerations about how 
to ascribe know- how in English and kin languages. It focused on know- how and it conceded 
to Ryle that skills are a diff erent matter from know- how. It even denied that know- how entails 
practical ability. A rich literature ensued, featuring responses and attacks to this version of intel-
lectualism, some questioning the original linguistic argument (e.g., Schiff er  2002 ; Rumfi tt 2003; 
Brogaard  2009 ; Bengson and Moff ett  2011 ; Wiggins  2012 ; Hornsby  2016 ); others reformulating 
the Rylean regress argument (Fridland  2013 ; Weatherson  2017 ); others still questioning the epi-
stemic parallel between know- how and knowledge- that (Poston  2009 ; Cath  2011 ,  2015 ; Setiya 
 2012 ; Carter and Pritchard 2015; Carter and Navarro  2018 ), the intelligibility of practical modes 
of presentation (Schiff er 2002; Noë  2005 ; Glick 2015), the compatibility of intellectualism with 
fundamental posits in cognitive science (e.g., Devitt  2011 ) and Stanley’s ( 2011b ) and Stanley and 
Krakauer’s ( 2013 ) characterization of automatic processes (Fridland  2014 ,  2017a ,  2017b ). These 
attacks have, in turn, generated more intellectualist responses, aiming at defending the linguistic 
argument for intellectualism (Stanley  2011a ,  2011b ), the intelligibility of practical modes of 
presentation (Pavese  2015 ,  2019 ), at providing extra- linguistic motivations for the view (Pavese 
 2013 ), at defending the epistemic parallel between know- how and knowledge- that (Marley- 
Payne  2016 ; Pavese  2018 ), at debunking the cognitive science argument (Stanley and Krakauer 
 2013 ; Pavese  2019 ), the gradability argument (Pavese  2017 ), or the most recent versions of the 
regress argument (Cath  2013 ; Beddor and Pavese  2020 ). 
 The debate on know- how is ongoing. But the recent years have seen an important shift in 
attention. While earlier intellectualists agreed with Ryle that skill and know- how come apart, 
now intellectualists have extended their focus from know- how to skill. There is, however, wide 
disagreement on how intellectualism about skills ought to be understood. Stanley and Krakauer 
( 2013 ) argue that skill consists in part in knowledge about how to perform an action but is not 
exhausted by it. In addition to knowledge, “motor acuity” is needed, as a sort of motor ability 
that can be tuned through practice and exercise. In contrast with this “hybrid view” of skill, 
01_9781138744776pre-c06_pi-99.indd   8 08-Jun-20   11:30:19 PM
9Introduction
9
Stanley and Williamson (2017) argue that skills are not themselves knowledge states but rather 
dispositions to know. Starting from considerations stemming from the role of knowledge in 
action theory, Pavese ( 2013 ) and Beddor and Pavese ( 2020 ) argue instead for a radical form of 
intellectualism, according to which both skill and know- how are knowledge states, for only 
knowledge states appropriately characterized can explain the distinctive intentionality and con-
trol of skillful performance. 
 Though diff erent in several respects, these forms of intellectualism all agree in taking skill 
and know- how to be understood in terms of a fundamental epistemic state of knowledge. By 
contrast, in the chapter “Know- how and Skill: The Puzzles of Priority and Equivalence,” Yuri 
Cath defends a still diff erent form of intellectualism— a “practical attitude intellectualism” as 
he calls it. Cath agrees with radical forms of intellectualism that skill and know- how are one 
and the same. However, Cath’s intellectualism diff ers from radical intellectualism on two scores. 
First, Cath’s intellectualism is  revisionary , for according to Cath know- how and skill are not 
knowledge states but rather belief states of a kind. In particular, Cath appeals to his earlier work 
(Cath  2011 ,  2015 ) to argue that know- how can be Gettiered, while knowledge- that cannot. 
Because he thinks that know- how and knowledge- that diff er in their epistemic and modal 
profi le, Cath argues that know- how and skill cannot be knowledge states but must, rather, be 
belief states. Second, while intellectualists typically appeal to distinctively practical modes of 
presentation when characterizing the sort of knowledge states know- how and skill consist in, 
Cath develops a form of intellectualism that does not appeal to practical modes of presentation. 
For one to know how to perform a certain task one need not entertain a proposition under a 
practical mode of presentation; rather, it is enough that one entertains the propositional attitude 
practically. 
 While radical intellectualism understands skills in terms of knowledge, in the last chapter 
of Part II, “Knowledge as Skill,” Stephen Hetherington reverses the order of explanation by 
defending  practicalism — the view that knowledge is a kind of skill or know- how and defends 
it from several objections. While knowledge of a fact or truth has long been conceived of as 
a belief with epistemically propitious features, Hetherington argues that this picture fails to 
explain the distinctive role of knowledge vis- à- vis action. According to Hetherington, a para-
mount question for a theory of knowledge that is often neglected by epistemologists is: how 
can knowledge so conceived ever motivate and guide action? This chapter introduces a novel 
answer to this question— practicalism — whereby any instance of knowledge is a skillful power 
to act, or a form of knowledge- how. Hetherington argues that this pragmatist conception of 
knowledge can tell a powerful story about what links knowledge and action: many actions are 
expressions or manifestations of knowledge, which is itself the power to act in such ways. 
 While skills fi gure prominently in virtue epistemology, in the debate between intellectualists 
and anti- intellectualists, and in discussions about the relation between knowledge and action, the 
interest in skill in epistemology goes beyond these debates and expands to social epistemology. 
The notions of skill and expertise are central to today’s discussions about what counts as a polit-
ical expert (e.g., Goldman  2001 ; Buchanan  2004 ,  2009 ; Guerrero  2016 ) as well as in the debate 
about virtue ethics and moral expertise (Driver 2013,  2015 ). The importance of skill and know- 
how for moral and social/ political epistemology will reappear in the fi nal part of this Handbook. 
 I.3  Skill, intelligence, and agency 
 The notions of skill and know- how fi gure prominently in the philosophy of action. As we have 
seen, for Anscombe ( 1957 ), intentional action is understood in terms of agential knowledge and, 
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moreover, it requires know- how. By contrast, Dreyfus ( 2000 ,  2001 ,  2005 ,  2007 ) thought that 
skillful action is the locus of embodied, embedded agency and used such action as an example 
motivating a non- representational theory of intentional action. Because of the centrality of 
skills in an account of intentional and intelligent action, Part III of this Handbook is devoted to 
chapters that discuss skills in relation to theories of agency. 
 In the  fi rst chapter of this section, “Consciousness and Skill,” Barbara Gail Montero launches 
a sustained attack on the broadly Dreyfusian account of skillful coping as mindless. Developing 
several lines of arguments from Montero ( 2016 ), the author targets the “the  just- do- it principle ,” 
that permeates much of the Dreyfusian discussion of skillful and mindless coping. According 
to the  just- do- it principle , experts perform best when their conscious minds are disengaged from 
their actions, when they are performing “automatically.” Montero critically assesses several 
arguments for the  just- do- it principle. One particular argument starts from the phenomenon 
of choking under pressure, where an individual performs signifi cantly worse than would be 
expected in a high- pressure situation. This phenomenon has been taken to be evidence that 
skillful action proceeds without conscious attention, because choking episodes are thought to 
arise from the fact that anxiety leads one to focus and direct one’s mind on the performance, 
which would otherwise proceed smoothly if mindless. The “explicit monitoring hypothesis” 
has it that in normal circumstances conscious monitoring interferes with high level of per-
formance. Montero reviews the extant empirical literature and shows not only that the meth-
odology underlying the experiments for the explicit monitoring hypothesis is controversial, 
relying on artifi cial experimental settings, but also that there are other possible explanations 
for the choking eff ects, which emphasize that changing the locus of the focus, more than the 
focus itself might be detrimental to the performance in choking under pressure. By carefully 
highlighting the shortcomings of this and other arguments for the  just- do- it principle, Montero 
argues that online conscious thought about what one is doing is compatible with expertise and 
surveys some empirical evidence that in fact skillful performance might require the full con-
sciousness of the expert. 
 Montero’s critique of the  just- do- it principle confronts Dreyfus and its other proponent in 
their own terms— i.e., by taking seriously phenomenological evidence and fi rst personal reports 
and by looking at skillful performance from the perspective of the embodied experiences of 
the real experts. This “ecological” approach to the study of skillful performance is theorized 
and defended in the following chapter, “Embodied Experience in the Cognitive Ecologies of 
Skilled Performance,” by John Sutton and Kath Bicknell. They argue that a properly ecological 
methodology requires looking at the real performances of experts in the environment where 
they are intelligently attuned, rather than in artifi cial and regimented experimental settings. It 
requires expanding standard sources for skill theory, to look not only at specialist work in sport 
psychology, music cognition or other rich bodies of applied research but also at practitioners’ 
own fallible but unique self- understandings. In order to anticipate concerns about the reli-
ability of self- reports, Sutton and Bicknell survey related methods from cognitive psychology, 
sport science, and cognitive ethnography, and home in on apprenticeship methods and work 
by researcher- practitioners. They illustrate the methodology by looking at an extended case 
study of cyclist Chloe Hosking’s account of the closing stages of her winning ride in the 2016 
La Course by Le Tour de France. Sutton and Bicknell argue that by triangulating Hosking’s 
narrative against other evidence, one can learn about the multiplicity of diverse cues to which 
this athlete was responding in on- the- fl y decision- making. 
 The link between skill and agency, and the relation between automaticity on one hand, 
and control and attention on the other, is further investigated by Wayne Wu in “Automaticity, 
Control and Attention in Skill.” Skill emerges from a shifting balance between automaticity and 




control over time. But how can a skillful performance be both automatic and controlled? As 
Wu teaches us, a rich psychological literature has assumed an overly simple connection between 
automaticity and control, assuming that performance can be under one’s control if and only if 
it is not automatic. This connection, so understood, stands in the way of a full understanding of 
skillful performance as both automatic and controlled. Wu argues that in order to understand 
this feature of skillful performance, we ought to think of the structure of intentional agency as 
the locus where automaticity and control merge. While it is true that the same process cannot be 
wholly automatic and at the same time wholly controlled, certain features of the process might 
be automatic while other features of the same process can be under one’s control. In particular, 
Wu proposes we individuate the properties of an intentional action that are under agentive con-
trol as those that are the result of the agent’s executive intention to perform the action in this 
or that way. On the other hand, the properties of a process that are not under agential control 
are those that are not the result of the agent’s executive intention. Wu argues that this way of 
retaining a strong division between automaticity and control also allows one to accommodate 
the observed gradualism in automaticity and control manifested in skill learning, for the set of 
properties that are automatic or controlled changes over time and so does the tuning of the spe-
cifi c action properties. Finally, Wu shows us how to apply this theoretical framework to a case 
study— the research on overt attention in batting sports. 
 The role of intentions and intentionality in skillful performance has long motivated 
intellectualist theories about know- how (Pavese  2013 ,  2018 ,  2020 ; Stanley and Krakauer 
 2013 ). If manifestations of knowing- how are intentional, because intentional action seems 
to require knowing what to do to initiate the action, intellectualists have argued that prop-
ositional knowledge about how to perform an action is central to skillful action. On this 
basis, Stanley and Krakauer ( 2013 ) argued that motor skill depends on knowledge of facts, 
forwarding a challenge to the standard interpretation of amnesiac cases, such as patient HM, 
that have led to the familiar dichotomy between procedural and declarative knowledge in 
psychology. In “Automatizing Knowledge: Confusion Over What Cognitive Neuroscience 
Tells Us About Intellectualism,” John W. Krakauer recapitulates his argument to the eff ect 
that neuroscientifi c evidence suggesting that procedural knowledge and declarative know-
ledge dissociate has been misinterpreted as evidence for an anti- intellectualist position. The 
right understanding of HM and other amnesiac cases, Krakauer argues, supports a version 
of intellectualism about know- how. Krakauer goes on to respond to some critiques of this 
earlier position. As Krakauer himself acknowledges, something was missing from Stanley 
and Krakauer’s ( 2013 ) version of intellectualism about know- how and skill— i.e., the role 
of a distinctively motor and procedural representation in the explanation of know- how 
and skill (see also Pavese,  Chapter 18 in this volume). Krakauer proposes that we integrate 
that account of skillful action by appealing to what he calls “control policies” (cf. Shmuelof 
et al.  2012 ; Haith and Krakauer  2013 ,  2018 ). As he understands them, control policies are 
“rules that automatize and are cached with practice” and which are no longer propositional 
once cached. For example, the policy for mirror drawing is to go left rather than right after 
making a leftward error; with practice this policy gets cached, which is why it does not have 
to be explicitly remembered by HM. 
 The role of procedural and practical representation in intellectualist theories about know- 
how and skills is discussed in the next chapter, “Practical Representation.” Carlotta Pavese 
elucidates the notion of a practical mode of presentation, fi rst introduced by intellectualist the-
ories of know- how, by comparing it to more familiar kinds of modes of presentation— perceptual 
and conceptual modes of presentation. By looking at psychological theories of motor control, 
Pavese forwards an account of the sort of motor and procedural representations that are posited 
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by those theories and, against a widespread skepticism about the representational status of motor 
representation, provides a novel argument for thinking that motor representations are  bona fi de 
representations, in that they are assessable for accuracy and inaccuracy as they succeed or fail 
to accurately represent the intended target of the motor task. In the second half of the chapter, 
Pavese explores the theoretical need for practical concepts— or practical ways of thinking— that 
often make appearances in the intellectualist theories of know- how (Stanley and Williamson 
 2001 ; Pavese  2015 ), in order to account for a distinctively  productive kind of reasoning— the cap-
acity for which seems to be lost in motor defi cits such as ideo- motor apraxia (Pacherie  2006 ; 
Pavese  forthcoming ). As she argues, far from being an unwelcome commitment of intellec-
tualist theories of know- how, practical representation (both conceptual practical representation 
and non- conceptual practical representation) ought to play a central role in any theory of skill, 
whether or not intellectualist, that takes into serious account psychological and neuroscientifi c 
evidence. 
 In the next chapter, “The Nature of Skill: Functions and Control Structures,” Ellen Fridland 
introduces a  functional view of skill, where skills are to be understood as functions from intentions 
to actions that are implemented by a variety of control structures, which have been learned 
through practice. Fridland argues that this way of conceiving of skill incorporates the strengths 
and avoids the weaknesses of extant versions of intellectualism and anti- intellectualism about 
know- how. For Fridland, control structures are responsible for the fl exible modifi cation, adap-
tation, and adjustment of goal- directed action. Further, on her account, control structures are 
hierarchically organized on at least three levels:  strategic , which includes practical planning and 
knowledge in action;  attention , which selects perceptual information in an intention- sensitive 
way and integrates that information with online motor representations; and,  motor , which 
involves motor representations that have been diachronically shaped through deliberate prac-
tice and which are, themselves, means- ends coherent with goal contents. In this way, Fridland 
maintains that motor representations are intelligent in several ways: in their capacity to adjust 
and adapt online to an unfolding action environment, in virtue of their learning history, and also 
because of their connection to states or structures of strategic control. 
 Further fl eshing out how we ought to understand the intelligence of motor control, Myrto 
Mylopoulos, in “The Intelligence of Motor Control,” argues that motor representations are 
intelligent not merely derivatively, as a result of their connection to intentions, but in their 
own right. To establish this position, Mylopoulos begins by introducing  the puzzle of skilled 
action — a version of which we have seen appear in Wu’s chapter : How can skilled action dis-
play robust intelligence despite being largely governed by motor control processes that are 
often characterized as brute, refl ex- like, automatic, and paradigmatically unintelligent? For 
Mylopoulos, intelligence is cashed out in terms of fl exibility and, thus, her challenge is to show 
that motor representations of the kind involved in skilled action are fl exible in the relevant ways. 
To establish this, Mylopoulos argues for a hybrid view of skilled action, which acknowledges 
the role of intentions and propositional knowledge but also holds that motor representations 
are themselves intelligent in virtue of their temporal and functional organization. According to 
Mylopoulos, motor learning is a process that involves both refi ning the structure of a motor 
program but also fi ne- tuning the parameterization of that program. Accordingly, Mylopoulos 
locates the diff erence between the expert and novice in the complexity of their respective 
motor representations (see Pavese,  Chapter 18 in this volume). As such, Mylopoulos’s solution 
to  the puzzle of skilled action involves elucidating the complex structure of motor representations 
in order to show that construing them as unintelligent is mistaken. 
 The  fi nal chapter of this part, “The Targets of Skill, and Their Importance,” discusses a crucial 
methodological question that arises when studying skilled performance: What is this something 




that one is skilled  at ? Joshua Shepherd points out that skill essentially involves an agent’s being 
excellent in  some way: the skilled agent is skilled at  something . This is the question of the “target 
of skills.” According to Shepherd, one ought to be pluralist about the target of skills:  agents 
display skill at actions, at games, and at a wide range of practices and activities. And this sort 
of pluralism about the target correspondingly motivates a sort of pluralism about skills, for it 
suggests that skills display variable structure, depending upon the target. 
 I.4  Skill in perception, imagination, and emotion 
 The next section of the Handbook is devoted to chapters that explore the connections between 
skill and perception, imagination and emotion. When it comes to phenomena like perception, 
especially visual perception, the connection to bodily skill has been forwarded as central in 
debates concerning embodied and enactive perception. For instance, as Siegel discusses below, 
Merleau- Ponty (2013/ 1945 ) made the connection to bodily action central to his theory of 
visual perception. Also, famously, J.  J. Gibson (2014/ 1979 ) argued that perception involved 
perception not only of colors or static properties but direct sensitivity to aff ordances or possi-
bilities for action. Importantly, aff ordances are relational properties, which depend on the kinds 
of actions or skills that an agent could perform in the perceived environment. More recently, 
Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë (O’Regan and Noë  2001 ; Noë  2004 ) have argued that percep-
tual experience is constituted in part by an agent’s know- how. More specifi cally, they argue that 
what one sees depends on one’s embodied knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies or, put 
another way, perception depends on sensorimotor skills. In contrast, connections between skill 
and imagination and skill and emotion, though implicit in some discussions, are still nascent but 
rich areas of philosophical inquiry. 
 Taking up the connection between action and perception, we begin with a chapter by Emily 
S. Cross. Cross provides us with a terrifi c overview of how the development and possession 
of embodied expertise aff ects action observation in her chapter, “Embodying Expertise as a 
Performer and Perceiver: Insights from the Arts and Robotics.” Cross begins with a brief over-
view of the history of thought— philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientifi c— as it pertains 
to the connections, or lack thereof, between perception and action. She goes on to review key 
empirical studies in the domain of the performing arts, which demonstrate a robust relationship 
between the possession of embodied expertise, both longstanding and  de novo , and the percep-
tion of action in that domain. That is, empirical research seems to indicate that the better one 
is at performing an action, the more one simulates that action when observing it. Cross goes 
on to review studies relating embodied expertise to aesthetic and aff ective experience and also 
to possible applications of this knowledge to social robotics, where understanding how humans 
relate to the actions of others may be crucial for developing well- calibrated, artifi cial, social 
agents. Part of the utility of Cross’s chapter is its evenhandedness in both presenting research that 
robustly supports a simulation theory of action and perception and also highlighting various 
studies that complicate a straightforward or linear relationship between greater amounts of 
embodied expertise and greater engagement of sensorimotor cortices, greater aesthetic enjoy-
ment, and even greater interpersonal rapport. 
 Working in a similar domain, Corrado Sinigaglia and Stephen A. Butterfi ll build out a the-
oretical framework for understanding the evidence that Cross introduces above by off ering 
a substantive explanation of the connection between skill and observational knowledge. In 
“Motor Representation and Knowledge of Skilled Action,” Sinigaglia and Butterfi ll begin by 
reviewing empirical evidence of increased skill or expertise leading to increased knowledge 
or accuracy in predicting the outcomes of observed actions within the domain of expertise. 
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Sinigaglia and Butterfi ll go on to ask why developing motor skill should provide agents with 
the ability to acquire observational knowledge concerning that skill. They answer that it is 
because both performing motor skill and observing skill involve a common element: namely, a 
motor representation. That is, they claim that the same motor representation is involved in both 
guiding action and observing someone perform that same action. 
 Next, Sinigaglia and Butterfi ll go on to consider an objection concerning the proposal that 
motor representations play this dual role. The objection runs that representations can only have 
one direction of fi t, but the role suggested above to motor representations has two. Sinigaglia 
and Butterfi ll respond to this potential objection by claiming that motor representations can 
have both a control and epistemic function relative to a system. As such, relative to one system, 
the motor representation can have a control function but, relative to another system, that same 
representation can take on an epistemic function. Sinigaglia and Butterfi ll end by considering a 
further potential issue with their view: the problem of how the content of motor representations 
can interface directly with that of personal- level epistemic states. They off er four proposals for 
how one might solve the interface problem that comes up at this juncture and go on to suggest 
empirical avenues to pursue in order to make progress on determining which of those solutions 
is true. 
 Moving from the connection between embodied expertises and action observation to 
questions about how skill might infl uence or constitute the processes of visual perception, we 
turn to Susanna Siegel’s chapter, “Skill and Expertise in Perception.” In order to understand 
how skill or expertise might be related to perception, Siegel proposes we work with a broad 
notion of skill, where exercises of skill are not necessarily instances of intentional action, and 
she further focuses on conscious perceptual experience. Siegel discusses three main ways in 
which perceptual experiences might be thought to manifest a subject’s skills in this broader 
sense. According to the fi rst, perceptual experience consists in, or necessarily engages motor 
skills. This idea traces back to the philosophy of Merleau- Ponty ( 2013/ 1945 ), according to 
whom in paradigmatic cases of perception, the fl ow of information is inseparable from the 
way a perceiver moves through a perceptual scene. Siegel reviews how this model of per-
ceptual experience as necessarily engaging motor skills has inspired contemporary thinkers 
such as Noë ( 2004 ) and Kelly (2005) to generalize it to cases of apparently static perception. 
According to one such proposal, static perception also engages the body, for it involves the 
bodily activity of fi nding optimal viewpoints. Siegel then turns to the second way in which 
perception might be thought to manifest skills— i.e., by involving recognitional capacities. 
Siegel points out that one way to articulate this idea is to embrace Lewis’s ( 1990 ) ability 
hypothesis: knowing what something looks like amounts to possessing certain sorts of prac-
tical abilities or know- how. 
 Finally, the third way in which perceptual experiences involve skills is by patterns of attention 
being aff ected by the skill and expertise that we have. As Siegel notes, distributions of attention 
might depend on scientifi c expertise:  for example, faced with the same sequence of X- ray 
images, a radiologist and a novice will parse each image diff erently. Perceptual learning might 
also depend on improved acuity in categorization. For example, gaining practice and expertise 
in music can improve the ability to fi nd the beat in a piece of music and keep track of it. Finally, 
cultural embeddings can shape our perceptual experience and attention. Here, Siegel reviews 
some important work providing experimental evidence that cultural stereotype can direct 
attention toward stereotype- congruent information, and away from stereotype- incongruent 
information (Eberhardt et  al.  2004 ) and that the extent of gaze- following behavior can be 
sometimes sensitive to race and social power (Adams and Kveraga  2015 ). 




 Extending considerations of perceptual learning to perceptual expertise, Dustin Stokes 
and Bence Nanay’s chapter, “Perceptual Skills,” starts out by off ering a way of distinguishing 
between properly perceptual and post- perceptual or cognitive skills. Stokes and Nanay go on 
to argue that cases of perceptual expertise, such as those found in expert birdwatchers or fi n-
gerprint examiners, involve properly perceptual skills. That is, these cases of expert perception 
involve skills of the perceptual system. Stokes and Nanay go on to consider the case of picture 
perception and likewise conclude that such perception involves perceptual skill. Importantly, 
what this shows is that possession of diff erent visual skills will result in diff erences in the phe-
nomenology of viewing the same picture. They end their chapter by isolating what they call 
“mechanisms” of perceptual skill: perceptual attention and mental imagery. In both cases, what’s 
most central to skill is that the development of both perceptual attention and mental imagery 
are sensitive to top- down information and are thus robustly connected to the semantic and epi-
stemic states of agents. Because of this, at least some perceptual skills, Stokes and Nanay argue, 
are properly attributable to the agent. Stokes and Nanay conclude by highlighting the fact that 
far from being some peripheral or niche area of theoretical work, perceptual skill is central to 
our full understanding of perception in general. 
 The  last chapter in this part to address skills of perception or, more particularly, skills of 
the visual system, is Keota Fields’ ambitious chapter, “Skill, Visual Prejudice, and Know- How.” 
Fields contends that the visual system learns to see in roughly the same way as a person learns 
to swim. More specifi cally, the suggestion Fields endorses is to treat visual perception, generally, 
as skilled Bayesian inference. Treating vision as a skill, Fields maintains, does justice to the cen-
tral commitments of a constructivist model of visual perception and, further, explains in a fairly 
straightforward manner the mechanisms of cognitive penetration. 
 Using this approach to visual perception, Fields goes on to argue that at least some cases of 
visual prejudice off er a counterexample to the often assumed identity between skill and know- 
how. This is because visual prejudice, as Fields argues, is an instance of skilled visual perception 
but does not manifest knowledge of facts. Using the example of implicit- bias infused visual 
perception, Fields argues that such an episode is an instance of skilled seeing because the epi-
sode is characterized by features that are diagnostic of skill: automaticity, diachronic refi nement 
(i.e., improvement through training), intelligent task sensitivity, selective attention, and control. 
Moreover, Fields argues that a proper construal of control, for which Fields reaches for Wayne 
Wu’s account (see Wu,  Chapter 16 in this volume), shows that episodes of visual prejudice are 
in fact intentional. However, since cases of visual prejudice do not manifest knowledge of facts, 
these skilled seeings cannot be instances of know- how. In this way, Fields argues that skills and 
knowledge- how cannot be identical. 
 Moving from perception to imagination, Amy Kind in “The Skill of Imagination,” lays out 
the case for thinking of imagination as a type of skill. Kind begins by extracting from the lit-
erature three central features of skill: Skill (1) can be done more or less well; (2) is under one’s 
intentional control; and (3) can be improved via practice/ training. These conditions serve as a 
general framework for categorization rather than as necessary and suffi  cient conditions of skill. 
Kind goes on to argue that at least certain types of imagination, namely sensory and experien-
tial imagining, meet these conditions. Thus, she concludes, sensory and experiential imagining 
should be classifi ed as skills. Kind ends by considering various objections to classifying imagin-
ation as a skill: what she calls the Socratic objection (i.e., where are the skilled imaginers?), 
the nativist objection (i.e., imagination cannot be improved via training), and the no feedback 
objection (i.e., what kind of feedback could possibly be used to improve imagination?). By 
reviewing several lovely cases of imagination’s role in invention, art, and empirical study, Kind 
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responds to objections and ends by noting the importance of thinking of imagination as a skill. 
She claims that not only can this conception of imagination help rein in philosophers who 
draw metaphysical conclusions from their stunted abilities at imagination but it can perhaps also 
entice us to train skills of imagination through childhood education and beyond. 
 In the  fi nal chapter of Part IV, “Emotion Recognition as a Social Skill,” Gen Eickers and Jesse 
Prinz argue that emotional recognition, which is often thought of as static, passive, and innate 
is actually best construed as a type of skill. Eickers and Prinz not only maintain that emotional 
recognition is a skill, but suggest that emotions themselves may actually be skills as well. Like 
Kind and Fields above, Eickers and Prinz begin by extracting from the literature several cen-
tral characteristics of skill. For them, the most notable features of skills are their improvability, 
practicality, and fl exibility. Eickers and Prinz then go on to show that emotional recognition is 
characterized by these properties and, further, that these properties of emotional recognition 
are often overlooked in one way or another by extant theories of social cognition: Evolved 
Expression Recognition, Theory Theory, Simulation Theory, and Direct Perception. Eickers and 
Prinz end by forwarding a positive conception of emotional recognition in terms of the skilled 
recognition of emotional scripts. On this way of understanding emotions, they are sequences 
of subevents “that include: causes, beliefs, feelings, physiological changes, desires, overt actions, 
and vocal and facial expressions.” They are called scripts because they are in some ways like a 
playwright’s scripts but, unlike a playwright’s script, they are fl exible and embody norms that are 
both statistical and philosophical. This view entails that recognizing emotions requires fl uency 
with these emotional scripts, which are variable, contextual, intelligent, embodied, and practical. 
 I.5  Skill, language, and social cognition 
 Human skills can manifest socially: in joint and coordinated action generally and in linguistic 
and communicative skill specifi cally. Part V includes chapters that look at skills in language and 
social cognition. 
 The section starts with the chapter “Skill and Expertise in Joint Action” by James Strachan, 
Günther Knoblich, and Natalie Sebanz, which focuses on the question: What are the mechanisms 
that allow people to perform skilled joint actions playing in a band, in a sports team, or in a col-
lective dance? Investigating the mechanisms whereby people come to be able to perform joint 
actions skilfully raises the question of how  coordination can be achieved in the course of coopera-
tive and competitive interaction. In addressing this question, this chapter draws on studies from 
a wide range of skilled joint actions, including music, sports, and dance, as well as on more 
basic coordination tasks designed to investigate fundamental mechanisms of coordination. The 
chapter describes empirical evidence for three main coordination mechanisms:   strategic action 
modulations ,  joint action planning and monitoring , and  action prediction . Evidence for strategic action 
modulations comes from studies in joint improvisation, where it was found that people tend 
to make themselves more predictable by systematically modulating the velocity profi le of their 
movements in order to achieve synchrony with their partner, by increasing the amount of ancil-
lary movements, which can also play the collaborative function to adapt to adverse conditions, 
and by controlling, and in some cases resisting,  entrainment , the process whereby two or more 
individuals producing regular patterns of behavior fall into the same rhythm. The chapter 
details the importance of expert action perception for prediction (see Sinigaglia and Butterfi ll, 
 Chapter 23 in this volume)— i.e., for coming to be able to read and anticipate the actions of 
others; the most recent studies on action perception showing the connection between motor 
expertise and the sophistication of one’s ability to perceive features of motor actions; and the 
mechanics of how people represent others’ aff ordances and limitations as well as the extent to 




which representation of the others’ action is helpful or detrimental to joint action. As a joint 
action requires the input of more than one individual to achieve a joint goal, it is not suffi  cient 
to represent what another could do. It is also necessary to monitor what that person  does , par-
ticularly with regard to any errors made, so that one can adjust one’s own behavior or prepare 
for any costs incurred. After introducing the most recent research on collaborative action, the 
chapter ends by discussing joint action in  competitive interactions. The authors show that perhaps 
surprisingly, competition involves some of the same coordination mechanisms described for 
cooperative joint action, such as strategic modulations of action, action prediction, monitoring, 
and co- representation. 
 Joint action also raises questions for phenomenological concepts of expert performance on 
which an expert operates completely on the pre- refl ective level of experience. As we have seen 
by looking at Dreyfus’ conception of skillful action, on some phenomenological conceptions 
of expert performance, the expert operates completely on the pre- refl ective (i.e., tacit, non- 
observational, non- objectifying) level of experience (Dreyfus 1997, 2002,  2005 ). In “Self- and 
Other- Awareness in Joint Expert Performance,” Shaun Gallagher and Jesús Ilundáin- Agurruza 
critically assess this view by looking at the role of self- awareness and the awareness of others 
during joint actions. They start by introducing a theoretical debate about the nature and the 
extent of individual self- awareness during experts’ performance and by reviewing the evidence 
motivating Shusterman’s ( 2008 ) and Montero’s ( 2016 ) “trained awareness model,” according to 
which expert performance requires a particular type of trained awareness. Then Gallagher and 
Ilundáin- Agurruza move to examining questions about the role of self- awareness of others in 
team and collaborative performances. Just like in the case of individual performance, the phe-
nomenological tradition features accounts suggesting that refl ection also interrupts team or 
cooperative performance, and that working together best remains pre- refl ective (e.g., Schutz 
 1976 ). In order to assess this position, Gallagher and Ilundáin- Agurruza review a detailed study 
of expert musical performance by Høff ding ( 2015 ). In his study of the Danish String Quartet, 
Høff ding conducted phenomenological interviews and focused on the precise experiences the 
musicians had while playing their best. It turns out that each member of the quartet had 
diff erent experiences while playing but all of them reported they could be thinking of or 
experiencing diff erent things. As they point out, these studies might show that Dreyfus was 
wrong to think that any kind of refl ective thinking necessarily interrupts performance. On the 
other hand, some of these studies also suggest that  explicit consciousness of the other players, 
or an explicit attending to one’s actions might not always be needed to make the performance 
work. At least in some cases, in line with Dreyfus’ analysis and against the trained awareness 
model, the real work seems to be done in a manner that involves skillful automaticity or a min-
imally pre- refl ective level. They conclude that the contrasting positions represented by Dreyfus 
and Shusterman might both be off  the mark, and they advocate an alternative  pluralist model 
that helps refi ne the analysis of self- and other- awareness in expert performance. 
 Among our distinctively and perhaps uniquely human skills are the uses of a range of 
sophisticated motor tools and cognitive and communicative tools. Are these human- specifi c 
skills biologically inherited, or are they learned? These questions are investigated by Antonella 
Tramacere and Richard Moore in “The Evolution of Skilled Imitative learning:  A Social 
Attention Hypothesis.” Tramacere and Moore discuss the hypothesis that these uniquely human 
skills arise on the back of our possession of a more fundamental skill:  imitation . Imitation is a 
form of action copying in which an agent is concerned to replicate the precise strategy of an 
observed demonstration. Tramacere and Moore review the ongoing debate about the origins of 
human imitation. According to one infl uential view, defended by Michael Arbib ( 2005 ,  2012 , 
 2017 ) among others, the Mirror Neuron System in humans is a candidate for being the neural 
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substrate of action copying behavior. As such there is an important innate component to imi-
tation that is the result of biological evolution. Against this view, a group of psychologists led 
by Celia Heyes ( 2018 ) have argued that imitation is a product of cultural and not biological 
evolution. As an alternative to both nativism and non- nativism about imitation, Tramacere and 
Moore propose a third account of the origins of imitation, that borrows elements from both the 
nativist and non- nativist hypotheses while off ering a parsimonious explanation of the cognitive 
and neurobiological diff erences between humans and other species. 
 As Tramacere and Moore make clear, imitation is central not only to the mastery of manual 
tools but also to the development of another distinctively human skill:  language . This brings us 
to the other main topic of this section: linguistic competence and its nature, which is discussed 
in two chapters of this Handbook. In “Semantic Competence,” Diego Marconi outlines a his-
tory of the debates concerning the ability to understand sentences of a natural language, ranging 
from Chomsky’s ( 1965 ,  1985 ) discussion of linguistic competence and his critique of philo-
sophical semantics to the recent debate about simulation theories. For Chomsky, linguistic com-
petence was a sort of knowledge underlying our syntactic competence that could not be simply 
identifi ed with a practical ability but that was not straightforwardly to be identifi ed to propos-
itional knowledge either— in the standard epistemological sense of knowledge available at the 
personal level and that requires justifi cation. Marconi reviews Chomsky’s criticism of philo-
sophical semantics, as well as the main philosophically originated semantic theories (Montague’s 
and Davidson’s). Both Davidson ( 1967 ) and Montague (see Thomason 1974) agreed in identi-
fying the aim of semantics with providing a theory of how the meanings of sentences depended 
on the meaning of the composing words and neither intended their theories as models of 
human semantic competence. Neither projects, nor their more recent cognitive developments, 
involved attention to psychological or neurophysiological plausibility of the semantic categories 
and processes that they posited. Marconi explains that this sort of criticism, raised prominently 
by Partee ( 1981 ) and others, gave rise to diverging responses. Some, like Jackendoff  ( 1992 ) and 
Johnson- Laird ( 1983 ) opted for a form of  internalism about the meaning of words according to 
which words got their meanings not by being suitably related to the environment but by being 
connected with internal representations and processes. By contrast, non- cognitive externalists 
such as Putnam ( 1975 ) thought that the meaning of natural kind words was fi xed by objective 
causal connections with objects and properties in the world. Finally, cognitive externalists such 
as Marconi ( 1997 ) maintained that lexical competence was partly based on perceptual and 
motor connections with the world out there. According to this view, knowing the meaning of 
words such as “pear” and “bed” involves the ability to perceptually recognize pears and beds 
as well as the ability to appropriately respond to commands involving such things. This sort of 
position was motivated by debates within and about Artifi cial Intelligence which emphasized 
the role of perception and motor action in the exercise of semantic competence as well as 
by neuroscientifi c results that appeared to prove involvement of motor and perceptual brain 
areas in comprehension and, more generally, in language processing. Such research generated a 
partly new paradigm, which made language understanding  consist in such perceptual and motor 
activations— i.e., the prominent simulationist paradigm (Barsalou  1999 ; Gallese and Lakoff 
 2005 , among others). Marconi ends the chapter by discussing this radical position and highlights 
some of its diffi  culties. 
 In “Pragmatic Competence,” Filippo Domaneschi and Valentina Bambini give an overview 
of the fi eld of pragmatics, which studies language in contexts. They start from reviewing Grice’s 
( 1957 ,  1975 ) understanding of meaning in terms of a speaker’s intentions and his distinction 
between what a speaker says by using a sentence and what the speaker intends to communi-
cate. According to a Gricean analysis of the notion of meaning in terms of speakers’ intentions, 




what a speaker  means to communicate does not need to coincide with what she explicitly says. 
The Gricean analysis has led contemporary linguists and philosophers to a mainstream view of 
pragmatics as the study of the speaker’s meaning and of the inferential processes of reconstruc-
tion of communicative intentions. Domaneschi and Bambini carefully investigate the reason 
why only in the 1980s did pragmatics become the subject of cognitive studies. Until then, it 
was conceived as having to do with the linguistic performance, rather than linguistic compe-
tence, and as such it was excluded from linguistic investigations having to do with the level 
of competence, pertaining to syntax. Fodor’s ( 1983 ) modular theory of mind refused to view 
pragmatic processing as governed by a specifi c and independently analyzable module in the way 
classic Chomskyan competence (Chomsky  1957 ,  1980 ) was. And the Gricean roots of prag-
matic studies contributed to pragmatic processing being viewed in strict relation with the ability 
of attributing mental states to others and hence largely tied with general and not module- 
specifi c mind reading abilities— i.e., with the theory of mind (ToM). Cognitive pragmatics arose 
as a revision of the Fodorian notion of module in order to account for pragmatic processing 
within the modular framework. Domaneschi and Bambini survey the most recent research in 
Experimental Pragmatics— where pragmatic phenomena are investigated via behavioral and 
neurolinguistic methods— that off er solid evidence in support of the thesis that pragmatic com-
petence is not limited to the ability to understand speaker’s intentions and, hence, pragmatic 
competence cannot be reduced to a ToM ability. They review experimental work on the cog-
nitive mechanisms governing processing of presupposition, conversational mechanisms such as 
turn- taking, understanding of metaphors, suggesting instead that pragmatic competence has 
specifi c characterization in terms of developmental trajectories, patterns of decay, and neural 
substrates— a characterization that is distinct and independent of a characterization in terms of 
mind reading abilities. 
 I.6  Skill and expertise in normative philosophy 
 In the fi nal part of the Handbook, six chapters address questions of skill and expertise in norma-
tive philosophy. As will be familiar to the reader, virtue ethicists have often appealed to skill in 
order to articulate the nature of moral cognition and judgment. That is, morality, for the virtue 
ethicist, amounts to a kind of expertise. However, there remain crucial questions about whether 
moral judgment and behavior is best construed as a kind of skill (Annas  1995 ,  2001 ; Stichter 
 2018 ) and whether wisdom can be construed as a sort of moral expertise (Driver  2013 ,  2015 ), 
about what kind of thing such a skill could be, whether morality might require skill even if 
morality itself is not a skill, and, importantly, how the practical demands of morality may require 
the development of moral perception or other perceptual and emotional skills. Questions of 
education, persuasion, and implicit bias and stereotype threat also arise in connection to these 
considerations, since it remains an open question whether and how we might be able to actually 
change not only our beliefs and attitudes but also our automatic, immediate, reactions, responses, 
perceptions, or associations through training, argument, or the development of virtue (Gendler 
 2011 ; Saul 2013). 
 The  fi rst chapter in Part VI is Julia Driver’s, “Moral Expertise,” where the author provides a 
superb overview of the major debates in the literature concerning moral expertise. She begins 
by comparing moral expertise to more familiar types of expertise, like those in the domains 
of science or mathematics. An important distinction between kinds of expertise that Driver 
highlights concerns the fact that moral expertise is normative and not merely descriptive. It is 
not only about how the world is but about how it  ought to be. And also, perhaps importantly, 
about how  one ought to be/ act oneself . 
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 Driver goes on to discuss in some detail the distinction between moral knowledge and moral 
understanding, and to consider which may be required for moral expertise. Driver herself thinks 
there are various ways to gain moral expertise, some of which do not require a full, systematic or 
articulable understanding of morality. In fact, moral expertise, in some cases, may simply amount 
to having an ability to make reliable judgments about moral matters. Driver ends by examining 
the role of empirical facts and moral action in moral expertise. In contrast to others in this 
section (e.g., Stichter and Bashour), Driver maintains that the way in which moral expertise is 
acquired is merely a contingent fact about what moral expertise is. As such, she holds that ana-
lysis of the normal development of moral expertise, even if in actual fact for humans it requires 
practice, does not tell us anything substantive about the nature of that expertise. 
 Moving from moral expertise to political expertise, Alexander A. Guerrero provides a con-
textualist, functionalist account of the normative political expert and expert political actor in 
“A Theory of Political Expertise.” First, Guerrero distinguishes between, on the one hand, what 
he calls the  expert political analyst (someone who has extensive knowledge about political topics) 
and the  exceptionally eff ective political actor (someone who is able to navigate political institutions 
eff ectively, regardless of moral outcome) and, on the other, the  normative political expert (someone 
who knows what ought to be done) and  expert political actor (someone who is particularly skillful 
in doing what ought to be done). It is the latter type of expertise that concerns Guerrero and 
that he considers to be the proper domain of political experts. 
 It is important to note that since Guerrero’s account of political expertise is functionalist and 
contextualist, it requires asking both about the purposes or ends of the political agent but also 
recognizing that those ends or purposes are not universal but relative to context and role. Doing 
justice to the embedded and contextual nature of political expertise, Guerrero explores what 
it means to be a normative political expert and expert political actor specifi cally as an elected 
political representative. Guerrero argues that the proper end or purpose of the elected political 
representative is to achieve the legitimating purposes of political institutions. These purposes 
include: preventing domination and harm; minority rights and justice; working together under 
conditions of disagreement and distrust; information management and use; respecting and pro-
moting equality; respecting and promoting autonomy; and promoting welfare. He goes on 
to explain that achieving these legitimating purposes requires more than moral expertise but 
also a variety of epistemic virtues, including epistemic humility and open- mindedness. It will 
also involve disagreement navigation, which requires knowing which paths are feasible and 
available under conditions of disagreement and also the skills of compromise, confl ict resolution, 
mediation, and the need to override dissenting opinion. For political expertise of the kind 
characteristic of the elected political representative, one should also exhibit the moral virtues 
of ethical leadership in addition to being a relatively expert moral analyst, so as to be able to 
make appropriate moral judgments in situations of complexity. Together, these conditions com-
bine to form a theoretical or philosophical proposal for what expertise for the elected political 
representative consists in. Guerrero insists, however, that such a framework is not the end of the 
project but should be tested through modeling and empirical study. 
 Expanding what it means to possess the virtue of justice from the political, social or 
moral domain to the individual, Paul Bloomfi eld develops a historically grounded account 
of justice as a personal, moral and intellectual virtue in “Skills of Justice.” The skills of justice 
apply broadly, Bloomfi eld argues, because they concern, very generally, making appropriate, 
measured judgments or just assessments. This way of thinking of justice, locates justice not 
only in the moral domain but also squarely in the epistemological domain, as a good moral, 
political or social judgment requires not only moral fairness but also epistemic accuracy. 
Moreover, the skills of justice apply not only interpersonally but intrapersonally, since making 




morally fair and epistemically accurate judgments concerns not only how we judge others 
but also how we judge ourselves. Strikingly, Bloomfi eld sees the skills of justice as applying 
even beyond the moral domain, since even in making e.g., scientifi c judgments, one has to 
judge judiciously, putting like with like and doing justice to relevant diff erences. In this way, 
the virtue of justice, as Bloomfi eld conceives of it, is an individual, intellectual virtue that 
applies across the board. 
 Moving from moral judgment to its connection with moral or virtuous behavior, Bana 
Bashour, in her chapter, “Why Moral Philosophers Are Not the Most Virtuous People,” 
provides us with an account of moral behavior that is grounded in skill. Bashour begins by 
providing examples that highlight the double- dissociation between moral judgment and vir-
tuous behavior: on the one hand, an example of a philosopher who reliably makes strong moral 
arguments but often acts selfi shly and, on the other, Huck Finn who makes the wrong moral 
judgment but still acts virtuously. 
 Bashour argues that moral judgment and moral action come apart because moral or virtuous 
behavior is a kind of skill and moral judgment is either not a skill at all or relies on a distinct 
set of skills. Bashour goes on to review the main intellectualist and anti- intellectualist positions 
concerning skill in general, as well as virtue as skill, in particular and argues that both positions 
have shortcomings. Bashour recommends pursuing instead the blended account that Ellen 
Fridland develops (see  Chapter 19 in this volume) where skill involves three levels of control. 
Bashour ends with two striking and timely examples of virtuous behavior where she describes 
how control at diff erent levels is relevant for moral action. Importantly, Bashour emphasizes that 
even in cases of virtuous action, motor control is substantively implicated in moral behavior. 
 From an analysis of virtuous, skilled action to an account of how virtue might be acquired and 
improved, Matt Stichter, in his chapter, “Virtue as Skill, Self- Regulation and Social Psychology,” 
develops a skill- based account of moral virtue in order to respond to situationist critiques of 
virtue ethics. Notably, the skill as virtue account that Stichter develops is heavily informed by 
empirical studies in psychology and he combines the lessons of those studies in order to recom-
mend a way forward for moral education. 
 Stichter begins by claiming that skill is essentially a sophisticated form of self- regulation. As 
such, understanding skill requires understanding the literature on self- regulation. Critically, we 
should begin by diff erentiating between goal setting and goal striving. That is, diff erentiating 
between the process of setting an intention, even a complex one with subgoals, and the process 
of striving to attain that intention via planning and action. On Stichter’s view, goal striving has 
often been overlooked by the literature on virtue, which emphasizes making the right judgment 
or setting the right intention but not developing the proper skills for achieving the ends to 
which one has already committed. 
 In contrast, a view informed by empirical psychology allows us to home in on eff ective strat-
egies for reaching goals, such as, for example, implementation intentions. Such  if- then intentions 
allow agents to deliberately set situation- specifi c strategies that can be used automatically in 
specifi ed circumstances. Moreover, deliberate practice of specifi c strategies can provide further 
refi nement of the means or skills necessary to reach one’s already set goals. This is especially 
important, Stichter argues, because much of the actual literature in social psychology (e.g., 
the bystander eff ect) shows defi cits in moral behavior can be attributed not to a lack of good 
intentions but to a lack in competencies and the related beliefs concerning one’s self- effi  cacy. As 
such, Stichter argues that moral education should be concerned not only with setting the right 
intentions or making the correct judgment concerning morality but with developing the often 
complex skills required for attaining our moral goals. It is through such skill- based education 
that stable virtue can be developed and that situation- specifi c forces may be overcome. 
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 Pursuing a similar approach to Stichter, Michael Brownstein, in “De- biasing, Skill, 
and Intergroup Virtue,” consults the literature in empirical psychology in order to develop 
an account of the skills involved in de- biasing others, that is, in diminishing the prejudices, 
stereotypes, and biases that others possess. Brownstein begins by noting that changing people’s 
opinions, attitudes, and beliefs is at the heart of a healthy democracy but goes on to review 
some depressing results concerning the actual success of changing others’ minds. Brownstein 
then goes on to highlight which skills, strategies, knowledge, and abilities are likely involved in 
successful de- biasing. Importantly, Brownstein thinks of the power to de- bias as a skill because 
it is something one can learn and improve over time with practice. So, what does the skill of 
de- biasing require? Unfortunately for the philosopher, Brownstein is pretty pessimistic about 
the power of argument or “going factual” to change people’s attitudes. Instead, Brownstein 
suggests that changing the perception of norms is at the heart of de- biasing because people are 
not only motivated to conform with norms but they are also concerned about the rewards and 
punishments associated with them. In order to change the perception of norms, Brownstein 
suggests that de- biasers do not directly try to change the attitudes that others have toward 
norms but, rather, the perception of what other people believe and feel. Skill in de- biasing then, 
may involve becoming a social referent, that is, a person with particular infl uence over other 
people’s perception of norms due to one’s e.g., status or prestige. Social referents can model 
virtuous norms, such as tolerance, compassion, open- mindedness, etc. and in so doing change 
what others think is acceptable, thereby also changing others’ motivation to conform with these 
new virtuous norms. 
 Note 
 1  The order of the authors is alphabetical. 
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